A policy maker faces a sequence of unknown outcomes. At each stage two (self-proclaimed) experts provide probabilistic forecasts on the outcome in the next stage. A comparison test is a protocol for the policy maker to (eventually) decide which of the two experts is better informed. The protocol takes as input the sequence of pairs of forecasts and actual realizations and (weakly) ranks the two experts. We propose two natural properties that such a comparison test must adhere to and show that these essentially uniquely determine the comparison test. This test is a function of the derivative of the induced pair of measures at the realization.
Introduction
The literature on expert testing has, by and large, treated the question of whether a selfproclaimed expert can be identified as such, while also not allowing for charlatans to pass the test. A striking result due to Sandroni (2003) is that no such test exists without additional structural assumptions on the problem. The basic premise of this literature is the validity of the underlying question of whether a forecaster, or rather a probabilistic model, is correct or false. In a hypothetical world, where only one model exists and the tester can only entertain the services of a single expert, this may make sense. Even then, one might wonder what is the tester to do whenever she rejects the expert. Does she turn to another expert? to her own intuition? In any case she would probably, implicitly, utilize an alternative (possibly untested) model. This motivates an alternative approach to the issue of expert testing and that is comparison of experts, which is the approach we pursue here. In this approach the tester is exposed to a few alternative models (forecasters) and a single realization of events. The tester then compares the two forecasters and decides which is the better informed one. Facing many (possibly conflicting) experts is commonplace in weather forecasting, financial forecasting, medical prognosis and more. Nevertheless, the design of comparison tests has been almost entirely ignored in the literature on expert testing. Two exceptions are Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2008) and Feinberg and Stewart (2008) which we will discuss later.
The approach we take in this paper is axiomatic. After defining exactly what is meant by a comparison test we will turn to discuss some desirable properties for such tests. We then construct a test with all the desired properties and show it is essentially unique. The setting we focus on is that of two experts and a test which (weakly) ranks the two and hence its domain consists of three outcomes. It may either point at one of the two experts as being better informed or it may be indecisive. Let us discuss the properties that are central to our main results.
Anonymity -A test is anonymous if it does not depend on the identity of the agents but only on their forecasts.
Error-free -Let us assume that one of the experts has the correct model (namely, he would have passed a standard single expert test which has no type one errors). An error-free test will surely not point at the second expert as the superior one (albeit, it may provide a non-conclusive outcome).
Reasonable -Let us consider an event, A, that has positive probability according to the first expert but zero probability according to the second. Conditional on the occurrence of event A a reasonable test must assign positive probability to the first expert being better than the second.
Tail test -As experts often require some initial data to calibrate their models, we would like to rule out tests whose decision is based on a prefix of the realized outcome. A tail test is one which depends only on forecasts made eventually, after the calibration phase. Whereas much of the literature emphasizes tests which provide their verdict at some finite outcome we take the opposite approach for some of our results and consider comparison tests that are based on a long-run performance. 1 
Results
We construct a specific comparison test, based on the derivative of two measures that are induced by the two forecasts derived from the likelihood ratio of the two forecasts. We prove that this test is symmetric, error-free, reasonable and is also a tail test.
1 Consider the classical example of an IID process. A forecaster who is aware that indeed the process is such must calibrate the model to learn its parameter. Initial forecasts may be wrong, yet those made after a calibration phase become more accurate and long-run predictions are spot-on.
We then show that the test is unique in the following sense. For any test that differs from the construction and is symmetric and reasonable there exist two forecasters for which an error will be made (the probability of reversing the order). If, in addition, the test is a tail test then this error could be made arbitrarily close to one.
Finally, our constructed test perfectly identifies the correct forecaster whenever the two measures induced by the forecasters are mutually singular with respect to each other. Requiring the test to identify the correct expert when the measures are not mutually singular is shown to be impossible.
Related Literature
Much of the literature on expert testing focuses on the single expert setting. This literature dates back to the seminal paper of Dawid (1982) , who proposes the calibration test as a scheme to evaluate the validity of weather forecasters. Dawid asserts that a test must not fail a true expert. Foster and Vohra (1998) show how a charlatan, who has no knowledge of the weather, can produce forecasts which are always calibrated. The basic ingredient that allows the charlatan to fool the test is the use of random forecasts. Lehrer (2001) and Sandroni, Smorodinsky and Vohra (2003) extend this observation to a broader class of calibration-like tests.
Finally, Sandroni (2003) shows that there exists no error-free test that is immune to such random charlatans (see also extensions of Sandroni's result in Shmaya (2008) and Olszewski and Sandroni (2008) ).
To circumvent the negative results various authors suggest to limit the set of models for which the test must be error-free (e.g., Al-Najjar, Sandroni, Smorodinsky and Weinstein (2010) and Pomatto (2017)), or to limit the computational power associated with the charlatan (e.g., Fortnow and Vohra (2009)) or to replace measure theoretic implausibility with topological implausibility by resorting to the notion of category one sets (e.g., Dekel and Feinberg (2006) ).
As previously mentioned, the comparison of experts has drawn little attention in the community studying expert testing, with two exceptions we are aware of, which we now turn to discuss.
Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2008) consider a non-counterfactual likelihood test for comparing two experts. They show that if one expert knows the true process whereas the other is uninformed, then one of the following must occur: either, the test correctly identifies the informed expert, or the forecasts made by the uninformed expert are close to those made by the informed one. Note that the test they propose is anonymous and reasonable but is not error-free. An asymptotic version of this likelihood ratio, however, will play a crucial role in our construction.
Another approach was suggested by Feinberg and Stewart (2008) , who study an infinite horizon model of testing multiple experts, using a cross-calibration test. In their test N experts are tested simultaneously; each expert is tested according to a calibration restricted to dates where not only does the expert have a fixed forecast but the other experts also have a fixed forecast, possibly with different values. That is to say, where the calibration test checks the empirical frequency of observed outcomes conditional on each forecast, the cross-calibration test checks the empirical frequency of observed outcomes conditional on each profile of forecasts.
They showed that if an expert predicts according to the data-generating process, the expert is guaranteed to pass the cross-calibration test with probability 1, no matter what strategies the other experts use. In addition, they prove that in the presence of an informed expert, the subset of data-generating processes under which an ignorant expert (a charlatan) will pass the Cross-Calibration test with positive probability, is topologically "small". However, this test, like the test of Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2008), is anonymous but is not reasonable (a concise example is provided in Section 4) and is error-free (proof is straightforward and omitted).
Finite or Infinite Test?
A long-standing debate in the literature on expert testing is whether a test should be finite. A test is finite if its decision is made in some finite time. In contrast, an infinite test may require the infinite sequence of forecasts and realizations prior to making a verdict. The argument for considering finite tests is that infinite tests are impractical.
Although we sympathize with the argument that infinite tests are impractical we do think they have academic merit. The construction of well-behaved infinite, possibly impractical, tests would eventually shed light on their finite counterpart. Thus, if the technical analysis underlying the understanding of infinite tests is more tractable than that of finite tests then the study of infinite tests should be the port of embarkation for this research endeavor. This is what motivates our approach in this paper.
Furthermore, in expert testing we should allow experts to calibrate their model given the data. Pushing the design of tests towards finite tests may result in tests that give a verdict before these models are refined and calibrated. In a way the recent success of 'deep learning' based on enormous data sets (paralleling our interest in long-run observations) testifies to the importance of patience in model (expert) selection and the benefit of looking at many data points.
Model
At the beginning of each period t = 1, 2, . . . an outcome ω t , drawn randomly by Nature from the set Ω = {0, 1}, is realized. 2 Before ω t is realized two self-proclaimed experts (sometimes referred to as forecasters) simultaneously announce their forecast, in the form of a probability distribution over Ω. We assume that both forecasters observe all past realizations and all previous pairs of forecasts.
An element ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , . . .} ∈ Ω ∞ is called a realization of outcomes and we denote by ω t = {ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω t } the partial history of outcomes up to period t (by convention ω 0 denotes the empty history). A cylinder C ω t {ω ∈ Ω ∞ |ω n = ω n , 1 ≤ n ≤ t} is a set of realizations which share a common partial history of outcomes up to period t. Let g t denote the σ-algebra on Ω ∞ generated by the cylinder sets C ω t and let g ∞ σ( ∞ t=0 g t ) denote the smallest σ-algebra which consists of all cylinders (also known as the Borel σ-algebra). 3 In addition, we endow Ω ∞ with the product topology, that is, the topology that is generated by a basis of cylinders. Let ∆(Ω ∞ ) be the set of all probability measures which are defined over the measure space (Ω ∞ , g ∞ ).
Let
be the set of all partial histories of length t and define the set of all possible histories by H t≥0 H t .
A (pure) forecasting strategy f is a function that maps finite histories to a probability distribution over Ω. Formally,
Note that each forecast provided by one expert may depend, inter alia, on those provided by the other expert in previous stages. We denote by F the set of all forecasting strategies.
A probability measure P ∈ ∆(Ω ∞ ) naturally induces a (set of) corresponding forecasting strategy, denoted f P , that satisfies any ω t ∈ Ω t such that P (C ω t ) > 0 and any
In other words, the forecasting strategy f P derives its forecasts from the original measure, P , via the Bayes rule. Note that this does not restrict the forecast of f P over cylinders, C ω t , for which P (C ω t ) = 0.
In the other direction, let f (f 0 , f 1 ) be a pair of forecasting strategies. Then it induces a pair of measures over Ω ∞ , as follows. A realization ω together with f induce a unique play path:
starting at the Null history, where ω t , f ω i,t denote the outcome at time t, and the probabilistic prediction of expert i for that period, respectively. Additionally, fixing time n ≥ 0, the prefix (of length n) and the suffix (starting an n) of h (ω,f 0 ,f 1 ) are denoted by h (ω n ,f 0 ,f 1 ) and h (n,ω,f 0 ,f 1 ) , respectively. Now consider a cylinder C ω t and letω ∈ C ω t , since any measure in ∆(Ω ∞ ) is determined by its cylinders, it follows that the pair f uniquely induces a pair of measures, which are
(1)
Comparison Test Definition 1.
A comparison test is a measurable function which inputs a pair of two forecasting strategies and a realization in Ω ∞ and which outputs a rank (weak order) over the two experts. Formally,
where
implies that expert i is claimed as better informed, while T = 1 2 implies the test is inconclusive (this cannot be avoided, for example, when both experts agree on their forecasts).
Definition 2. A comparison test is called symmetric whenever
In other words, the expert chosen by T does not depend on the expert's identity (0 or 1). Note, if f 0 = f 1 then any symmetric test T must output 0.5 for all ω ∈ Ω ∞ . Our definition of a comparison test T suggests that the outcome of the test may depend on predictions made over realizations that did not materialize. In this paper we study a restricted class of tests-those that do not depend on forecasts made over unobserved realizations. Formally, Let h :
∞ be a function that maps a triplet (ω, f 0 , f 1 ) to its uniquely induced play path,
For any test, T , and a pair of forecasting strategies, f (f 0 , f 1 ) ∈ F × F , we denote by
= k} the set of realizations for which the test outputs k.
Definition 3. A test T is error-free with respect to
A test T is called error-free if it is error-free with respect to the set of all forecasting strategies, F . In other words, if one of the forecasters uses P , then with P probability zero the other forecaster is identified as the better informed one. Obviously a test which constantly outputs 1 2 is both anonymous, prequential and is also error-free. Obviously this test has no value. Inspired by this we ask whether there are meaningful error-free tests. It turns out that error-free tests are very restrictive in how well they can distinguish between two forecasters. In fact, whenever the measures induced by the two forecasters are mutually absolutely continuous, then an error-free test cannot guarantee to identify the better informed expert. Formally,
On a set of realizations that has probability one according to forecaster 0 it is not necessarily the case that the test will identify him as better informed.
Since P
T,0 ) = 1, which by the symmetry of T contradicts the assumption that T is error-free.
The next property of a comparison test asserts that for any set of realizations assigned zero probability by one forecaster and positive probability by the other forecaster, there must be some subset of realizations for which the other forecaster is deemed superior.
Definition 4.
We say that a test T is reasonable if ∀ f (f 0 , f 1 ) ∈ F × F , for any measurable set A, and for any i ∈ {0, 1}
It should be emphasized that reasonableness and error-free are not related notions. To see why error-free does not imply reasonableness just consider the constant error-free test T ≡ 1 2 . An example for which reasonableness does not imply error-free is left to the end of Subsection 3.3.
We now turn to our construction of a prequential, symmetric, error-free and reasonable comparison test.
An Error-Free and Reasonable Test
The following test is derived from the likelihood ratio of the two measures induced by the two forecasters.
and define
Consequently, the functions, D f 0 f 1 (ω), D f 0 f 1 (ω) are measurables as lim inf, lim sup of z t , respectively.
we say that the forecasting strategy f 1 is differentiable with respect to the forecasting strategy f 0 at ω and write
D f 0 f 1 is the derivative of f 1 with respect to f 0 . Consider the following non-counterfactual symmetric test Lemma 2. Fix 0 < α < ∞ and let A ⊂ Ω ∞ be a measurable set. Then
Proof. (a) Let A be a measurable set which satisfies the left side of (a) and let
Consider the following set of cylinders
Note, it follows from (5) that F A is not empty where sup{t| C a t ∈ F A } = ∞. By Lemma 1 we are provided with an index set J and a collection of pairwise disjoint sets {B j ∈ F A } j∈J such that
Hence
Since the above inequalities hold for any open set U which contains A and
it follows that ∀ǫ > 0 We now turn to show that the derivative of one measure with respect to another exists and is finite almost surely.
and it follows from Lemma 2 that
and consequently
For the second part let
where applying Lemma 2 gives: bP , b) ). Hence,
where from (7), (8) we obtain
The Properties of T D
Now that we have established the existence and the finiteness of the test T D , let us prove it is a reasonable and error-free test. We do this in two separate claims:
Proof. Let A be a measurable set such that P f 0 (A) > 0 and P
For a > 0 let
Note that if P f 0 (R a ) > 0 then applying Lemma 2 for the set R a yields,
Since by Lemma 3 D f 0 f 1 exists and finite P f 0 − a.e., we conclude that
and the test is reasonable.
Claim 2. T D is error-free.
Proof. Note that
By Lemma 3,
The Uniqueness of T D
The next theorem asserts that there exists a unique reasonable and error-free test. That is, any error-free test T = T D which is reasonable, admits an error. Let us first establish what we mean by T = T D :
We now turn to show that at all pairs (f 0 , f 1 ) where T = T D , T must admit an error, and on top of that, if T is a tail test, then there exists a pair (f 0 ,f 1 ) such that the probability of the error term is arbitrarily large.
In addition, by Claim 2, T D is error-free, therefore
which contradicts the assumption that T is error-free. 
Tail Test
We now turn to introduce the notion of a tail test. We will argue that the test T D is a tail test. In fact, our next theorem asserts that any other tail test that is reasonable will not only admit an error but will admit an arbitrarily large error.
. In other words, a tail test must yield the same output for any given two pairs of forecasting strategies whose play paths eventually coincide after some time n > 1, and whose conditionals are strictly positive up to time n.
Since L t ((ω, f 0 , f 1 )) > 0 by the left part of (11) it follows that 4
Additionally, by the same consideration we have
and therefore (12) and the Claim is concluded. Before we address the main theorem let us prove the following claim.
Claim 4. If T is reasonable then for any measurable set A
Proof. Let A be a measurable set and (w.l.o.g) assume by contradiction that
T is reasonable thus (3) yields P
Proof. By Theorem 1 (w.l.o.g.) there exists a pair f = (f 0 , f 1 ) such that P 
Let 0 < ǫ < 1. Fixω ∈ B f and observe that from (14) 
Thus, applying Claim 4 with the set Cωn yields P f 0 (A f T,0 ∩ Cωn) > 0 and consequently fω 0,t > 0, ∀1 ≤ t ≤ n − 1 is inferred from (1). Now, modify f to be the forecasting strategy f whose one step ahead conditionals satisfy
5 Note, by construction, ∀ω ∈ A f T,0 ∩ Cωn, i ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ t ≤ n − 1 we have
,t =fω i,t > 0, and since T is a tail test it follows from (11) 
and therefore completes the proof.
The next example shows that the result in Theorem 2 cannot be obtained if we relax the requirement that T is a tail test; it furthermore illustrates that reasonableness does not imply error-free.
be play paths which satisfy
and consider the following test
Note, for every triplet (ω, f 0 , f 1 ), whose induced play path coincides with − → h or ← − h , there exists i ∈ {0, 1} such that
where the left equality holds since T D is error-free. Moreover, since P f i ({(1) ∞ t=1 }) > 0 for i ∈ {0, 1} and T D is a reasonable test, it follows that T is reasonable even as it admits a bounded error by (16) . 5 Note that the corresponding forecasting strategyfi determines the one step ahead forecasts along ω, only through the history of outcomes and does not depend on the full histories, i.efi(ω)
Ideal tests
Recall that an error-free test eliminates the necessity of pointing out the less informed expert. A stronger and more appealing property is to point out the better informed expert. We consider tests that exhibit such a property as Ideal:
It is called Ideal if it is Ideal with respect to F.
In other words, whenever expert i knows the actual data generating process and expert 1 − i does not, an Ideal test will surely identify the informed expert.
Trivially, any Ideal test with respect to a subset of forecasts A is also error-free with respect to the same set. The following is a straightforward corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1.
There exists no Ideal test with respect to a set of forecasts A whenever it contains two forecasts which induce measures, one of which is absolutely continuous with respect to the other.
This immediately entails:
Corollary 2. There exists no Ideal test.
However, whenever A contains no such pair of forecasts, then an Ideal test does exist. To prove this we must first accurately define the notion of mutually singular forecasts. Definition 9. Two forecasting strategies, f 0 , f 1 ( = f 0 ) ∈ F, are said to be mutually singular with respect to each other, if there exist two disjoint sets
A set A ⊆ F is pairwise mutually singular if ∀f 0 , f 1 ( = f 0 ) ∈ A, f 0 , f 1 are mutually singular with respect to each other.
The next lemma asserts that a reasonable test is able to perfectly distinguish between far measures which are induced from forecasting strategies which are mutually singular with respect to each other. 
However, note that P Obviously, T is a well-defined symmetric and non-counterfactual. Showing that T is Ideal with respect to A IID is a mere application of the law of large numbers.
Discussion
Consider a scenario where we require some expert advice on the evolution of some unknown system (e.g., the economy or a financial market). We typically entertain a few experts and would like to make sure we take the advice from the better informed one. This suggests that expert testing should be framed in comparative terms. Instead of asking whether or not a single forecaster is indeed an expert or a charlatan, as is done in the lion's share of the literature on expert testing, we advocate a different approach in which we compare a few experts; the test is designed to spot the better informed one. We provide some natural properties for infinite tests and show that these properties uniquely characterize the test T D proposed in Section 3. Two natural directions for extending this line of work are: (1) consider finite tests, namely tests that output their verdict in some finite time; and (2) consider alternative properties and axiom systems.
